Articles - Inside Indonesia: The peoples and cultures of Indonesia

Christine Foster

Published: 29 July 2007

Balinese people favour green initiatives in recovery effort Christine Foster Many people, whether members of the multi-ethnic and multinational community living on Bali, officials and businessmen from Jakarta, or groups and aid agencies from abroad, are committed to helping Bali recover from the recent tragedy. The reasons are numerous: economic disaster looms on the horizon; its pristine image is now tarnished by the phrase 'soft target'; its people suffer endemic corruption, and mismanaged development. Post-bomb Bali has been inundated by benefit concerts, fund-raising dinners, media campaigns and action plans to restore, revitalise, and repair Bali. Among it all, a deeper dilemma is emerging, one which demands honesty about the serious environmental and social problems in Bali from all those involved in the massive recovery movement in Bali. No paradise The Kuta bombing showed the world that in stark contrast to its heavenly image in the tourist brochures, Bali is not immune to terrorist attacks. Indeed, even before the bomb, one need only encounter a drug dealer or pimp in Kuta's chaotic streets, gaze upon the garbage piles lining roads, or wade through a flood in the rainy season to see that all was not well on the island. The many environmental, social and economic issues plaguing Bali stem from years of Jakarta-led developmentalism and official corruption. The well-intentioned billions (yes billions) of dollars pledged to restore Bali must overcome rampant greed, and rampant bureaucracy in order to be properly spent, and consensus on how to do it is slow in coming. It must be kept in mind that Bali-cum-paradise was not developed exclusively by, or even for, the Balinese. For decades, the Indonesian government's grand development scheme for the island focused primarily on mega-projects for tourism, relying on Jakarta or foreign investors to build the hotels and tourist attractions, and aid agencies like the World Bank to provide loans for the roads, waterworks and other infrastructure necessary to support a mass-tourism industry. The explosive pace of development in the southern part of Bali where most tourism is based set the tone for the next decade of unrestrained development. Well-financed investors from outside were free to do as they liked, and the Balinese followed suit with shops, galleries and bungalows, often selling ancestral land to finance these small-scale projects. Regional master plans drawn up by the government to ensure environmental sustainability, or even the quality of life for Bali residents, was easily altered to accommodate wealthy, well-connected investors. The great roads built to serve the tourists have attracted smaller but no less aggressive investors who have erected strip malls, villas, and other tourist based businesses. Development planning was inadequate, and long before the bomb, the island's too few roads weren't wide enough for the tourist-laden buses, its water distribution system couldn't deliver adequate water to residents (though golf courses were eternally green and swimming pools filled) and land in the developed parts of Bali had reache8 prices far beyond the reach of the average Balinese. Those who were lucky enough to have a helping hand onto the tourism bandwagon now face a bleak immediate future. Since that fateful night in Kuta, hotel occupancy in many establishments has plummeted to single digits. Though the holidays saw a brief surge of arrivals of mostly domestic tourists to the island, they have, for the most part, returned home. Many believe that a US-led assault on Iraq in early 2003 will keep the majority tourists away for at least a few more months, and will most certainly affect bookings for the high season of June-August. Then there is Indonesia's national election in 2004, which holds no promises to be peaceful. Few tourists walk the towns of Kuta, Sanur and Ubud and many workers, especially those in the substantial informal sector of the tourism industry, have been sent home to wait for better days. Recovery, big business-style Bn the meantime, the Indonesian Government, foreign aid agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), companies and private individuals have embarked on various campaigns and initiatives to help Bali recover. The biggest and most recent is 'Bali for the World', a well-funded campaign initiated by Kadin, the Indonesian Business Association. Initially, the Bali for the World Committee came to the island with lots of money and little understanding of the real issues facing post-bomb Bali. Over the holidays, the Committee sponsored a series of highly publicised public concerts, and invited high-level bureaucrats from Jakarta to watch dancers clad in Hollywood renditions of Balinese traditional dress sing songs of hope and peace. With the President and her husband, Mr. Taufik Kiemas the centre of media attention, the events left many Balinese to wonder why the government and well-connected business people from Jakarta would spend seventy billion rupiah (A$ 13 million) for a series of mega-concerts when the money could be used more effectively to fix some of Bali's more serious problems, like mounting garbage, scarce urban water supply or even an antiquated education system. Made Nurbawa, of the Indonesian environmental organisation Walhi, felt that Balinese were ready to move on and were annoyed by the ongoing post-tragedy campaigns, speeches and events. Of the recent concert series he said, 'I think we need to look at Bali and the world, not Bali for the World. What the Balinese want is to be quiet (ngeneng). Life needs to slow down. The Balinese have already dealt with the bombing in their own way with the Parisudha Karypurbhaya ceremony'. Balinese organised the ceremony in November 2002 in order to restore the island's cosmic balance. Homegrown initiatives Thankfully, the scope of Bali's recovery has expanded beyond Kuta, victims of the bombing, and even the Balinese economy to address issues of social and environmental sustainability. Jakarta and Balinese NGOs are committed to working together in order to benefit the island and its residents. Activists in the recovery effort in Bali are taking steps to ensure that the Balinese are included in decisions about how and where the money is spent. Among them is activist Viebeke Lengkong, a Kuta resident and a member of the locally based Samigita, a citizen group deeply involved in the Bali Recovery. According to her, the most critical issue facing Bali is 'the potential for social conflict and disintegration stemming from a lack of human security'. Her definition of security includes access to healthcare and education for the Balinese as well as the health of the environment in which they live, especially those in rural areas far from the tourist centers of Bali. 'Communication and cooperation is the most important thing in Bali's recovery,' she comments, describing the key to overcoming the suspicion and corruption that characterised initial recovery efforts. Recently, well over 1,000 volunteers converged on the village of Catur in the Kintamani area to plant a total of 50,000 trees alongside local villagers in a forest vital for the island's watershed. The aim of this project was to raise awareness about illegal logging, a practice that has been running rampant in Bali and elsewhere in Indonesia. Among the volunteers were village residents, government officials, activists, members of the military as well as expatriates. This same program, sponsored in parp by the Bali for the World Organizing Committee, will be repeated in coming months in other regencies in Bali. Other planned campaigns, not all funded by Jakarta, include instituting permanent garbage collection and recycling schemes, revamping Bali's public healthcare system, and campaigning for sustainable urban planning. These homegrown development initiatives reveal that the Balinese are acutely aware of the negative impacts tourism development has had on their island, and are taking steps to repair the mistakes of the past. For the time being, no one can find the magic mantra to bring back all of those dollar-laden tourists back to the island. In all honesty, though, Bali has been blessed with an opportunity to become more than an icon of paradise in the collective imagination. By implementing sustainable solutions to long term environmental and social problems, the Balinese are taking steps to help their embattled island and in the process, improving their own standard of living. Christine Foster (luhbulan@denpasar.wasantara.net.id) is currently studying Sustainable Development at Murdoch University in Perth. Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2004

David Wright Neville

Published: 29 July 2007

The Bali bombings reveal the failings of Australian-Indonesian intelligence co-operations David Wright Neville The terrorist bombings of the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar last October confirmed what many Indonesia watchers had been loathe to admit; that a small number of Indonesian Muslims have embraced a violent fanaticism once viewed as a peculiarly Middle Eastern phenomenon. That this might be the case proved difficult to accept mainly because it challenged accepted wisdom that Indonesian Islam was and remained culturally discrete - a mostly benign tradition unsullied by the demagoguery of extremist Islamist agendas in other parts of the world. As writers such as Bob Hefner have pointed out, Indonesian Islam has always been marked by a vibrant pluralism. Moreover, those who would compartmentalise it into a neatly defined 'apolitical' category were guilty of a romantic Orientalism that denied historical and contemporary realities. Indonesian Islam has never been impervious to cultural and political influences in other parts of the world, and nor will it be in the future. Short-sighted For anybody even remotely aware of the cultural dynamics in a globalised world, it should have come as no surprise that some Indonesian Muslims would find parallels between their own predicament and the worldviews and political messages emanating from distant corners of the Islamic world. It was similarly predictable that those who peddle such messages would target Indonesian Muslims. Yet these possibilities appeared to have been lost on both the Australian and Indonesian intelligence communities. Right up until early 2002, Indonesia watchers in the Australian intelligence community dismissed reports of growing contacts between al Qaeda and militants in Indonesia as irrelevant. One especially sceptical senior intelligence official ridiculed such reports with a dismissive wave of the hand coupled by a derogatory reference to 'mad muzzies'. This short sightedness is partly attributable to the resilience of stereotypes of Indonesians, and other foreigners for that matter, within the Australian foreign policy and security bureaucracy. But it also reflects a general ignorance, at senior policy levels in particular, of global cultural and political dynamics and their impact on individual communities. In the case of the Australian intelligence community, these shortcomings are rooted in the rarefied atmosphere within which analysts work. In brief, it is an environment that discourages open exchange with outside experts, especially in academe or the private sector. There is a refusal to accept that such exchanges can be useful even without the disclosure of classified material. More than a decade ago the CIA recognised the intellectual atrophy that can incubate within an overly restricted analytical environment. After all, the CIA habitually over-estimated the former Soviet Union's military prowess and then failed to predict its collapse. Since then, CIA analysts have actively solicited counter-views to those that prevail within the intelligence establishment. Conferences are regularly convened with outside experts, including critical and even leftwing voices, to try and minimise the dangers posed by analyses generated within closed environments. If, in the American case, good analyses fail to generate good policies, at least there is the White House to blame. Not so in Australia. After failing to predict the fall of Suharto, the pogrom in East Timor, the election of Abdurahman Wahid, his fall, and the rise of Islamist terrorism one would think that the CIA's Australian counterparts would be seeking to solicit a similar range of views, if for no other reason than to expose the Indonesia 'experts' to a dose of reality. Sadly, this does not seem to be the case. Dummy Supplementing engagement with 'outside experts' are bilateral intelligence exchanges, or 'Intellex', whereby Australian officials from Australian agencies meet with their foreign counterparts to discuss issues of mutual interest. Mostly these exchanges with Asian counterparts amount to little more than a diplomatic t�te-�-tote, with generalities exchanged but very little discussion of specifics. On rare occasions such meetings generate valuable snippets of information and analytical insights. Yet there is little chance of this happening with Indonesian services because since the East Timor crisis Indonesian agencies, the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency (Bakin), the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (Bais) and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), have refused to meet formally with their Australian counterparts. On-going indignation within Indonesian intelligence circles at Australia's alleged support for pro-independence groups in East Timor has meant that Australia's meagre intelligence assets in Indonesia have had to take on the burden. This makes the task of mapping the organisational spread and operational strength of groups like Jemaah Islamiyah extremely difficult. It may surprise many to learn that Australia has a comparatively small foreign intelligence capability, effectively 'out-sourcing' much of the information it needs to exchanges with friendly services within the UK-USA alliance that links Australian intelligence to the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. At the very least, Australia's small intelligence capabilities belie the delusions of regional grandeur evinced by that antipodean Napoleon John Howard and his nonsensical threats of unilateral pre-emptive military action against suspected terrorist targets in the region. But herein lies another major problem from the Australian perspective. There is a perception in Indonesia, and Southeast Asia more generally, that Australia is an unreliable intelligence partner. In particular, the soothing affirmations of camaraderie and regional brotherhood whispered by Canberra's Southeast Asian diplomats are belied by Australia's image as an outpost of US foreign policy, Washington's Far Eastern branch office within which John Howard serves proudly as chief clerk. Moreover, in the current climate, with Washington determined to play the lead and supporting roles in the War on Terror (and Australia reduced to a walk-on bit part) Jakarta knows it can deal directly with Washington on counter-terrorism issues. In other words, why talk to the dummy when you can go straight to the ventriloquist? Australian officials have worked hard to overcome this problem which, to be fair, is more the making of political leaders in Canberra and Jakarta rather than intelligence officials per se. And since the Bali attacks it appears as though some sensibility has been reinjected into the relationship in the form of a new spirit of cooperation between the Indonesian police and the Australian Federal Police. However, it remains to be seen whether the relationship can be rebuilt on the back of the Bali investigation. But even if it can, there are other problems that need to be dealt with. Risks There is little doubt about the determination of some Indonesian intelligence officials to work closely with their Australian counterparts. But their efforts are often hobbled by several deeply embedded structural problems; in particular, the politicisation of Indonesian intelligence and inter-service rivalries. There is little evidence to suggest that military intelligence in particular has reformed its ways. It is difficult to separate Bakin from TNI's overall command structure, and just as regional TNI commands are riddled by corruption and a sense that they alone know what's best for their own region and the nation as a whole, so too do Indonesian intelligence agencies connected to TNI, notably Bais and Bakin. This is not to suggest that BIN is much better. The erratic performance of BIN's mercurial head, Hendropriyono, his mishandling of allegations of an al Qaeda-linked training facility in Poso, as well as allegations he was complicit in the murder of Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay, not to mention his own shady business dealings, have already been well documented. Of particular concern is evidence that certain elements within the Indonesian intelligence community remain hostile to any negotiated peace in Aceh, West Papua or other trouble spots. The allegation that TNI had a hand in the murder last August of two US citizens and an Indonesian national near the Freeport mine is just one example of the organisation's troubled image. If true, this allegation, and others relating to ceasefire violations in Aceh, raises serious questions about the value of working with Indonesian intelligence. Why? Because recent research into the evolution of terrorist groups around the world suggests a close correlation between brutalisation at the hands of the state and the tendency by some individuals and groups to resort to terrorism as a mode of political agitation. By cooperating more closely on intelligence matters with an unreformed TNI, Canberra thereby risks abetting a worsening of the terrorist problem in Indonesia. This risk is especially acute in the area of counter-terrorism, and it would arise in cases where uncorroborated information about a certain individual or group was passed to Indonesian military intelligence for verification. In such a scenario, it would not be unusual for the information to implicate individuals not involved with terrorism per se, but either knowingly or unknowingly associated with insurgency groups or even organisations involved in basic human and civil rights movements. There is a real risk that such information passed from Australian agencies in the name of counter-terrorist cooperation could enhance TNI's ability to brutalise dissident groups. Apart from the obvious ethical issues involved, co-operation between Australian and Indonesian intelligence agencies in such a scenario risks contributing to the types of abuse of power that feed the community anger and frustrations upon which terrorists feed. Of course criticisms of this type have been made before. The usual reply, from spokespeople for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Defence (because Australian intelligence officials will neither confirm nor deny), is that intelligence co-operation, like that of defence co-operation, is designed to protect Australian lives. And, they remind us, don't forget those Australian government programs that teach Indonesian security officials how to respect human rights. This is bunkum. If the Indonesian intelligence community's behaviour up until the East Timor crisis is evidence of the benefits of close cooperation with their Australian counterparts, then it is the type of cooperation that Australians and ordinary Indonesians could well do without. Dr David Wright Neville (David.WrightNeville@arts.monash.edu.au)is a Senior Research Fellow at Monash University's Global Terrorism Research Project. Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2003

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Published: 29 July 2007

No joy for extremists in post-bomb Indonesia Ed Aspinall Immediately after the bombings in Bali on 12 October, there was much speculation in the foreign, especially Australian, press, that this was a watershed event for Indonesian politics. Nothing in the country would now be the same, or so the commentators argued. Political alignments would shift, the military would reassert itself, Islamic radicalism surge and the country face international isolation. Certainly, it is possible to imagine circumstances in which some of the dramatic predictions might have been realised. In particular, the way that the government responded to the bombings was crucial for Indonesia's relations with the outside world. If foreign powers like Australia and, especially, the US had judged it was not seriously investigating the attack, or, worse still, turning a blind eye to its perpetrators, then Indonesia could have become a pariah state, with disastrous consequences. Instead, the outcome on this score has been close to the reverse. There was unprecedented, large-scale and effective cooperation between Indonesian and foreign police. Within weeks, those responsible began to be arrested and foreign officials heaped praise on the government and police. Indonesia had won its spurs as a reliable ally in the War on Terror. In the context of the surprisingly effective police response, most of the more dramatic predictions have not come true. The myth of military omnipotence In particular, the Bali bombing did not become a pretext for a political resurrection for the Indonesian military (TNI), even if some generals tried to use it for this purpose. For example, immediately after the bombing, the hardline Army Chief of Staff, Ryamizard Ryacudu, ordered the army hierarchy to 're-open the intelligence network' and stated that there should be no further talk of abolishing the military's territorial structure. It is true that the post-September 11 world and Megawati's Indonesia represent an increasingly benign climate for the TNI. Immediately after the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998, the TNI was excoriated domestically and internationally for its record of human rights abuses. Officers felt that their institution was under siege. Nowadays, President Megawati herself is sympathetic to the views of many of the more hardline generals (Ryamizard is reportedly a personal favourite). After September 11 and, especially Bali, senior US, Australian and other Western officials made many public comments about the need to restore military cooperation with Indonesia, adding further to TNI officers' views that human rights are moving off the international agenda. It is no surprise that there are reports that some officers privately believe that it is only a matter of time before military dominance over politics will be restored. There have certainly been many signs of increased military confidence, such as the string of acquittals in the East Timor human rights trials. On the ground, especially in places like Papua and Aceh, military brutality remains common. However, Indonesia still has a very long way to go before the military's dominance is restored. New anti-terrorism regulations, for example, do little to enhance the military's power. Even on core issues of security policy, there are signs that the hawks do not have it all their own way. For example, the December 2002 peace agreement in Aceh (see the article in this issue) may be vulnerable to sabotage by military hardliners, but it came about despite their frequently-stated objections to dialogue with 'separatists'. Despite the existence of hardline elements within it, the TNI remains greatly constrained by continuing public suspicion and hostility. While there has been much disillusionment with the outcome of reformasi, there is not (yet) any general clamour in the urban middle classes, let alone other parts of the population, for the return of authoritarian rule. One poll, conducted by the newspaper Kompas last October, revealed that only 42 per cent of respondents believed that the TNI had a 'good image', down from 58 per cent a year earlier. Most officers recognise this poor public image, and it accounts for their circumspection when dealing with political issues. Hence, Armed Forces Commander General Endriartono Sutarto repeatedly stressed that TNI would not take advantage of the new anti-terrorism rules and the post-bombing climate to stage a political comeback. The bombings and associated security atmosphere may thus have marginally strengthened the hands of the military, but not to the dramatic degree first feared. Challenges for Muslims A second important consequence of the Bali bombings has been to increase the isolation of hardline Islamist groups which advocate violence, although here too we shouldn't exaggerate the impact. It is well known that the majority of Indonesia's Muslim community supports religious tolerance and pluralism. Even so, since 1998 small hardline and violent groups have flourished. Underlying causes are complex, but immediate political factors have been influential. For example, it is widely believed that elements from TNI supported some militant groups, including the Jihad Militia (Laskar Jihad) which sent several thousand fighters to participate in communal conflict in Maluku. In addition, leaders of mainstream Islamic organisations (former President Abdurrahman Wahid was a notable exception) were often reluctant to confront the militants and their ideas. Vice-President Hamzah Haz, head of the Muslim United Development Party (PPP) even visited Ja'far Umar Thalib, the head of Laskar Jihad, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, alleged Jemaah Islamiyah leader, when they were being detained for, or accused of instigating, violent acts. Some mainstream Muslim leaders also tacitly endorsed violence when they believed Muslims were under attack (for example, Amien Rais, speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly, in 2000 publicly backed groups which wanted to go to Maluku to engage in jihad). Early after the bombing, as Greg Fealy explains in this issue, there were widely aired views in the Islamic community that such a heinous act could not possibly have been perpetrated by Muslims and must instead have been the work of foreign intelligence agencies. The police investigation initially reinforced suspicions about victimisation of Muslim groups, but the evidence it turned up eventually, it seems, convinced much of the public that an Islamist network was indeed responsible. This has significantly changed the climate in which militant Islamist groups operate. Leaders like Hamzah Haz have been forced to disavow their former flirtation with hardline groups. There have also been signs (actually first visible some weeks before the bombings) that the security forces are taking a tougher line against violent groups, evidenced by arrests of leaders of Laskar Jihad and the 'anti-vice' vigilante group, the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI). After the Bali bombings, General Endriartono Sutarto several times stated that all informal militia in the country should be disbanded, a step taken by Laskar Jihad and FPI (although at least in the former case apparently having more to do with internal problems than government pressure). In the wake of the bombings, many liberal Muslim intellectuals adopted a primarily defensive posture, reiterating that Islam has nothing to do with terrorism. At times, it appeared there was almost a syndrome of denial that Islamic doctrine could be used to justify violence. Some Muslim leaders, however, took the offensive and moved to more vigorously promote religiously liberal and pluralistic ideas (see box). Consolidation of a new political order A third conclusion one may draw after the Bali bombings is that, despite the authorities' successes in tracking down the perpetrators, Megawati's government has been unable to reap many political benefits. Much public praise has been directed toward the police (with many letter-writers telling newspapers that this was the first time they had ever felt proud of the Indonesian police forces). But in the highest ranks of government there were many signs of the familiar bickering among cabinet members and policy drift. Megawati herself initially reacted astutely, visiting the site of the bombing the day after it took place. But within days, she had reverted to her normal remote style, and there was little sign of either symbolic or effective policy leadership on her part. Megawati's performance thus reinforced growing dissatisfaction with her personal leadership style, not only in the broad public but also in within the ranks of her own party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Sections of the party were critical of her decision to endorse the re-election of Jakarta mayor Sutiyoso (who is widely believed by Megawati's supporters to be responsible for a 1996 military attack on their party's headquarters). In recent months some senior party members have voiced increasingly explicit criticisms of the government and its performance. Even so, Megawati still ranks consistently highest in popularity polls for future presidential candidates. Despite early predictions in some quarters, the Bali bombing and its aftermath have not appreciably improved the prospects of a 'green' Islamic ticket (probably with Amien Rais as its chief candidate) in 2004 elections. Overall, then, what can we conclude about Indonesian politics after the Bali bombings? Above all, the violence and the response to it seem to have reinforced previously visible trends. Some of the tumult of the immediate post-Suharto period is dying down (though it can easily erupt again, especially in response to Indonesia's economic and social crisis, as a series of large demonstrations against price rises in January illustrate). The more extreme and violent Islamist groups are on the defensive. The worst communal violence in places like Maluku and Poso in Central Sulawesi seems to be declining. There are even signs, if not of permanent solutions, at least of reduced tensions in Aceh and Papua. The military is more confident. The government is still ineffective, but it looks stable. A new hybrid political order is settling into place. Indonesia does not have a perfect democracy with full-scale civilian supremacy, human rights, effective law enforcement, social justice and the like. But nor is it a system where the military and central government bureaucrats determine the fate of the country like they once did. Ed Aspinall (edward.aspinall@ asia.usyd.edu.au) is an IRIP board member and lecturer in Asian Studies at the University of Sydney. Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2003

Tim Behrend

Published: 29 July 2007

The public teachings of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Tim Behrend Two weeks after the attacks on the Kuta nightclubs, Indonesian police arrested Abu Bakar Ba'asyir on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities in Indonesia. The charges against him relate to a series of bombings which preceded, and do not include, the Bali bombing, but he has gained international notoriety for his links to the alleged perpetrators of the Bali attack, many of whom referred to him in their confessions to Indonesian police (see box). According to the International Crisis Group, an independent think tank based in Belgium, Ba'asyir is unlikely to have masterminded the bomb, but probably knows more about it than he is willing to divulge. In the article below, Tim Behrend argues that Ba'asyir's public teachings do not advocate violence. Clearly, Ba'asyir is a controversial figure. Is he a misunderstood preacher, or does he mean to incite violence? We welcome readers' reactions to the following article, which attempts to understand this ambiguous figure. Government authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the United States have singled out an Indonesian cleric, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, accusing him of being the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a shadowy organisation of Islamic extremists 'aim[ing] to set up a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia ' through terrorist means and revolution'. They have assumed links beween JI and al Qaeda, and dubbed Ba'asyir the Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia. From December 2001 they were urging Indonesia to take a stand against international terrorism and arrest Ba'asyir, basing their concern on information gained through the intense interrogation of mostly uncharged, untried political detainees rounded up in post-September 11 terrorist dragnets. Indonesian officials resisted, claiming rightly that there was no basis in Indonesian law to act on these requests. But after the horrific Kuta nightclub bombings on 12 October 2002, Ba'asyir was fingered by those same governments as the probable Indonesian point man for the attack. Subsequently, Indonesian police arrested Ba'asyir in relation to an earlier series of bombings; charges have not yet been entered for the Bali crime. The international media remains as convinced today as in the first hours after the blast that Ba'asyir, JI, and al Qaeda are linked to the Bali ombings. Experts on the international lecture circuit continue to expound on Ba'asyir's politics and religious teachings, though few of them have first hand access to the sermons and writings in which Ba'asyir has widely expressed his views; fewer still have the language and cultural skills required to analyse these materials. In this article, I temporarily put aside the secret prison confessions of uncharged political detainees, the circumstantial evidence of personal and religious associations, and the fear-mongering hype of pundits in the corporate media, and instead examine Ba'asyir's persona on the basis of what he has verifiably said and done. He is, after all, a public figure, not a cave-dwelling shadow. He has been actively engaged in an open exchange on what Indonesia is and should be. What he has contributed to that discourse should not be treated as if it didn't exist. Abubakar who? Ba'asyir was born in 1938 in a small town in East Java. His father and grandfather were Hadrami immigrants, his mother of mixed Yemeni and Javanese descent. He boarded from 1959-1963 at Gontor, a well-known modernist Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Madiun. Afterwards he continued his studies at an Islamic university in Solo majoring in dakwah, the Islamic equivalent of missionary studies. His politics began in the Islamic Masyumi party, but became progressively radicalised. He indulged in provocative symbolic resistance to the Suharto regime, refusing to fly the Indonesian flag or display presidential icons at the Islamic boarding school, al mukmin, based in the Ngruki neighbourhood of Solo, Central Java, that he co-founded in 1971. Further, he generally considered the secularist Indonesian state to have no validity for Muslims and publicly resisted accepting the state Pancasila philosophy as the formal foundational principle for all social organisations. Ba'asyir was jailed without trial for a number of years. In 1985 he and others fled to Malaysia to escape further imprisonment. Only after Suharto's fall did he return from exile, part of a tidal flow of repatriating Islamist refugees. Back in Indonesia, Ba'asyir returned to Ngruki as a teacher and helped found an Islamist non-government organisation called the Council of Indonesian Mujahidin (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia MMI), and resumed his roles as polemicist and preacher with a growing national reputation. After September 2001 he was catapulted to regional then international notoriety by the accusations made against him in the reactive anti-terror campaigns. With Bali he became one of the most recognisable figures of the world terrorist pantheon. Suddenly print and broadcast media from CNN to the local radio station were populated by newly minted analysts and commentators, themselves anxious to understand, and help explain to others, what was happening in Indonesia. Many were forced to scramble their way up a steep learning curve, in the process cannibalising one another's ideas in a frenzy of mutually uncited paraphrasing. One idea that continuously appeared was the notion that a radical redrawing of national boundaries was a central tenet of Southeast Asian Islamists. 'The plan is breathtaking - to create one Islamic state from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore to parts of the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar,' according to CNN's Maria Ressa in one version of this idea. Ba'asyir was said to openly campaign for this Islamic super state. Ba'asyir's public profile In November and December 2002, I spent several weeks interviewing Ba'asyir, his associates at al Mukmin, members of MMI, and other 'hard line' Islamists. Based on those interviews, a review of Ba'asyir's available writings, and a five-hour underground video CD series of his sermons entitled Understanding Key Concepts in the Teachings of the Islamic Faith, I have not found evidence to suggest that he preaches the overthrow of Indonesia and its replacement with a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic super state. Ba'asyir does speak regularly and in blanket terms of the moral bankruptcy of the Indonesian state. He preaches the absolute and unique veracity of 'Islam', the need to promote it in society. He rejects the legitimacy of the secular state out of hand (see box). But he goes farther than simple, if strident, moral absolutism. His political analysis travels far into the realm of conspiracy theory in which international and Indonesian Christianity, together with a cartoonishly-drawn cabal of Jews/ Zionists/ Israelis/ Mossad, combine to divide, corrupt, and undermine Muslims and Islam. A similarly deep vein of anti-Semitism is found in the ideas of other leading members of MMI, particularly its functional chief, Irfan Awwas. In their view the US either perpetrated or allowed September 11 to happen; the American government was also the Machiavellian sponsor of the Bali bombings. With the exception of his ideas of Islamic moral and civilisational superiority and racially tainted theories of international politics, the thrust of Ba'asyir's teachings is eminently moral: discipline, simplicity, poverty, responsibility, cleanliness, honesty, hard work, dedication, good parenting, good citizenship. Revision of Indonesia's constitution so that it incorporates shari'ah is necessary to enable these virtues to be publicly and universally inculcated. For Ba'asyir, the current environment is far too permissive in general, and fatally flawed by its establishment on kafir principles, including popular democracy, a usurious banking system, social equality of the sexes, and licensing of immoral (and culturally unacceptable) behaviour for economic gain. But Ba'asyir does not himself publicly advocate violence against the perceived ungodliness of the political system. It must also be emphasised that despite endlessly repeated media claims to the contrary, Ba'asyir does not speak in formal or concrete terms about either the establishment of a Daulah Islam Nusantara, or Southeast Asian Emirate. This political configuration is no more than a gossamer ideal whose formation neither he nor his MMI confederates seriously espouse or actively promote. Ba'asyir is personally a man of simplicity, religious devotion, abstinence, and discipline. His politics are naive, and only selectively informed. He is devoid of critical, comparative knowledge of world history. He is deeply rooted in a tradition that nourishes anti-Jewish sentiment - as well as other forms of ethnic prejudice - and he in turn has come to embrace conspiratorial forms of anti-Semitism. In short, there is little about Ba'asyir's politics that can be praised, and much that is troublesome. Despite his patent monoculturalism, Ba'asyir's message challenging the assumptions of American and Western dominance (which he calls cultural terrorism) and offering an alternative view of modernity is timely and fully in tune with international currents. And it is certainly not illegal. An Indonesian democracy worthy of the name must protect even the grating voice of Ba'asyir until proven guilty, however outside the mainstream of majoritarian politics, however out of harmony with the generally liberal and secular opinions that characterise Indonesia today. Anything less would be a step backwards towards the repressive policies and Muslim-muzzling of the Suharto years. Tim Behrend (t.behrend@auckland.ac.nz) is a lecturer at Auckland University. A more detailed version of this article can be viewed at www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/ asia/tbehrend/ Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2003

Greg Fealy

Published: 29 July 2007

Conspiracy theories in post-bomb Indonesia Greg Fealy In the months following the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia was awash with conspiracy theories regarding the identity of the perpetrators and the methods used to blow up the two nightclubs. Most of these theories attributed blame for the attacks to foreigners of one sort or another. The most popular accounts claimed that the US government masterminded the attacks and provided the necessary high explosive materials and bomb-making expertise. A succession of media polls in late October and November showed a majority of respondents thought the US was behind the bombings and one 'Detikcom' survey revealed 70 per cent blamed the CIA (see box). Other theories suggested Mossad, MI-6 or one of Australia's intelligence agencies was involved, and several asserted that the bombings were the work of foreign al-Qaeda operatives. With the exception of a number of allegations that the Indonesian armed forces or intelligence services might have been complicit, nearly all the conspiracy theories downplayed or denied the involvement of Indonesians, particularly in planning the attack and assembling the bombs. It was argued that Indonesian extremist groups lacked both the ability to organise such a sophisticated operation and the expertise to put together bombs as powerful as that which destroyed the Sari Club. Such theories remained popular even after the police arrested a string of key suspects and began releasing detailed information regarding the terrorist activities of Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members. Conspiracism This preoccupation with conspiracy theories, often referred to as conspiracism, is not unique to Indonesia. There is a substantial scholarly literature recording the phenomenon at many points in history and in many parts of the world. Conspiracism is especially common in deprived, traumatised or repressed communities where reliable information is scarce, intra-communal mistrust is high and the state is given to arbitrary abuse of its citizens. In the Indonesian case, seldom has conspiracism been so pervasive as in the aftermath of Bali bombings. This would seem to reflect a sense that the world is now more hostile towards Indonesia and that Western nations and foreign corporations are seeking to exploit the country's economic and political problems for their own ends. Many Indonesians cite the 1997 financial crisis and East Timor's independence as evidence of the West's role in undermining national integrity. There is also a widespread view that separatist movements in West Papua and Maluku receive Western support. Indonesian conspiracy theorists therefore tended to see the attacks in Bali as a continuation, if not culmination, of a broader US project of domination. Many believe that the US carried out or sanctioned the attacks in order to discredit and weaken Indonesia as well as reinforce perceptions of Islam as a violent religion. The US could thus step up pressure on the Megawati government to crack down on Islamists and support the Bush administration's proposed war against Iraq. Part of the reason for the popularity of the conspiracy theories following the Bali bombing was the extent of press coverage given to them. Predictably, the more strident sections of the Islamist press such as Sabili, Media Dakwah and Jurnal Islam gave prominence to alleged international plots. The case of Republika Perhaps less expected was the role of Republika, the leading 'Islamic' daily, in promoting conspiracy theories about the Bali bombing. For the past decade, Republika has claimed to represent the quality end of the Islamic press with high standards of reporting, analysis and presentation. But in fact, of all the major dailies, Republika's coverage was the most journalistically questionable and served to fan conspiracy theories relating to the bombing. In late October and early November, a number of conspiracy theories were given prominence in Republika. The first was that the Australian government may have played a role in the bombing and was engaged in a cover-up. It reported that a 'key eyewitness' to the Paddy's Bar bombing, Kadek Alit Margarini, had been 'forcibly' evacuated by Australian officials without the approval of her family and Indonesian doctors and had died in an Australian hospital on 19 October. She was cremated shortly afterwards, without the family's permission and without an autopsy. The paper said various aspects of the Kadek case were suspicious. It reported staff at Sanglah Hospital in Denpasar as saying that the patient was stable prior to evacuation, but that Australian doctors had insisted she be flown to Perth. A later story quoted an unnamed Indonesian doctor as being shocked by news of her death, saying that her condition had not been that serious. Furthermore, it quoted an Indonesian forensic expert as asking why there had been no autopsy prior to cremation. 'If the victim was cremated immediately, then the question arises - what was there to hide?' (25 October and 15 November 2002). Although not stated explicitly, the articles insinuated that Australian officials had irresponsibly expatriated Kadek, and possibly played a hand in her demise, in order to prevent her from telling what she had seen. Republika also reported that the corpses of four Australian soldiers had mysteriously 'disappeared' from the bombsite without ever being registered with the Sanglah Hospital morgue. Furthermore, it reported that nurses handling corpses had been told by the hospital not to discuss the issue. An unnamed forensics expert said that the bodies may have disappeared because they were 'important material evidence' or were 'closely connected to the Bali bombing case'. The article went on to mention that several US and Australian navy ships had docked in Balinese ports in the months preceding the bombing. It said that one of the Australian vessels, the 'logistics' ship Westralia, made an 'unofficial visit' (12 November 2002). No direct connection was drawn between the 'missing corpses' and the naval visits, but the placement of the stories seemed designed to suggest to the reader that the soldiers may have entered Bali on one of the ships. In its search for far-fetched accounts of the bombing, Republika turned up the Western Australia-based Joe Vialls, whom it generously described as a 'private investigator' and 'explosives and intelligence analyst'. Vialls might be more accurately labelled an extreme right-wing professional conspiracy theorist. His website (www.geocities.com/vialls/) is filled with virulently anti-Semitic and anti-US views. For example, he asserts that the Bali bombing, the Port Arthur massacre and the death of Princess Diana were all sinister international plots and that Australia had become a 'test bed' for the 'New World Order'. Republika quoted Vialls as saying that the Bali bomb had actually been a micro-thermonuclear device, not conventional explosive as had been asserted by the Indonesian and international investigators. (This theory seems to have first appeared on the website of the conservative US radio talk program, the Hal Turner Show in mid-October). He also claimed that the Australian government had tried to cover up evidence supporting this finding by deleting the eyewitness account of an army captain on the Australian army's official website and had also ordered raids against Indonesians suspected of JI involvement in order to divert public attention away from the issue. He furthermore asserted that the US, Israeli and Australian governments pressured the investigators to blame Muslims for the bombing (10 and 13 November 2002). Vialls was reported as an expert commentator and no attempt was made to test the plausibility of his theories. Perhaps the most surreal theory carried in Republika was that CIA, Mossad, MI-6 and Asio agents had descended on Bali before and after the bombing because they had heard there was going to be 'war' between 'narcotics networks'. These agencies 'wanted to use (menumpangi - lit., ride on) the war for their own objectives'. The rival intelligence services were then said to have got involved in a 'battle' which had left 20 Australian agents dead. The source for this story was 'intelligence sources' (12 November 2002). No supporting evidence was presented in the article and there was no indication of any attempt to corroborate the story. At one level, Republika's peddling of conspiracy theories regarding the Bali bombings represents a lamentable failure to uphold journalistic standards, particularly in a paper that aspires to be a journal of record. The most improbable of explanations were routinely passed off as worthy of serious consideration. Moreover, insinuation and implication took the place of rigorous investigation and analysis. In effect, Republika alluded to sinister covert forces having responsibility for the Bali attacks and left the rest to its readers' imaginations. Republika's lapse in standards might easily be dismissed as nothing more than journalists surrendering to their prejudices. But as scholars of conspiracism have shown, conspiracy theories can have a profound impact on public perceptions and actions. In particular, it can distort public debate, inclining people to believe what is dubious or untrue. In Indonesia, as in many other countries, conspiracy theories have in the past fuelled community conflict, provoked mass protests and led to ill-advised government decisions. The Bali bombings and subsequent revelations about Indonesia-based terrorism raise important issues that require informed and thoughtful responses. Republikaohas served its readers poorly by focussing on fanciful conspiracy theories rather than substantive reporting. Dr Greg Fealy (greg.fealy@anu.edu.au) is a research fellow and lecturer in Indonesian politics at The Australian National University. He is currently teaching at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2003

Mayra Walsh

Published: 29 July 2007

Life in an East Javanese Islamic boarding school Mayra Walsh It's still dark, 4.15am, when my close friend Eet, a class 6 student wakes me. I hear sleepy voices and splashing water coming from outside my bedroom window as the small community here at Darur Ridwan slowly comes to life. The microphone in the mosque is tested, a few coughs, and the morning call to prayer begins. In a few minutes everyone will be gathered in the small mosque behind the main house. Eet, a small but very confident and focused young woman who was assigned as my helper when I first arrived, urges me to get up or I'll be late again. My pesantren, Darur Ridwan, is situated in a small village in the eastern most part of East Java, Banyuwangi. Most of the students, like Eet, come from neighbouring villages, although some have come from as far away as Bali, Surabaya and Sulawesi. They are the daughters of farmers, businessmen, teachers, office workers and house wives who work hard to pay considerably more than the fees at the local school so that their children receive a strong moral and religiously orientated education. Gathering together to pray at dawn is a refreshing way to start the day here. The atmosphere is clear and cool as I join in the morning prayer with the 60 or so students and several women from neighbouring houses. I wear the all-white prayer clothes, wash my hands, face and feet before entering the mosque, recite the appropriate prayers in Arabic (which I have not fully memorised yet), and take part in the now familiar salat routine stand, bow, stand, kneel, and so on. Beyond the stereotypes So what is a non-Muslim, Australian university student doing living at an Islamic boarding school in East Java? I am here as part of the Australian student exchange program, Acicis, doing a field study project. I am here because I want to learn about Islam, and what better way to learn than to totally immerse myself in the subject? Since the unearthing of the Jemaah Islamiah network in the aftermath of the Bali bomb, international media have depicted Indonesian Islamic boarding schools as 'hot beds' for Islamic extremists. Some people may think I am throwing myself in at the deep end by immersing myself in a community accused of fostering extremism. But I feel that these depictions have made my experiences at Darur Ridwan so much more meaningful, relevant and important. I have had the opportunity to see first hand the reaction of the community here at Darur Ridwan to the Bali bomb blast of 12 October and the ensuing investigation and arrests. I consider myself very privileged to have enjoyed such a unique experience that has been quite different to the image of the unfriendly, anti-Western pesantren portrayed in international media. As news and footage of the horrific event in Bali came through, I sat on the floor, eyes glued to the small television screen in the main house for hours watching the live reports and becoming increasingly distressed as the number of confirmed victims grew. But I was not alone. Also sitting on the floor with me and in chairs behind me was Pak Kiai, members of his family, several senior students and several teachers. They comforted me and joined with me as we expressed our utter disbelief and extreme grief at seeing so many innocent lives lost and so many more injured. I talked about the huge and devastating impact the bomb would have on Indonesia and in particular the Balinese community, and also the consequences for relations between Australia and Indonesia. They weren't particularly interested in discussing the political or economic impacts. They talked about the families of the victims and in particular the fact that so many were from Australia. 'There is nothing in the Al Qur'an that supports the murder of innocent people like those tourists in Kuta. These crazy terrorists are distorting true Islamic teaching to suit their own political agenda. Islam is a peaceful religion.' Modern curriculum It didn't take me long to feel at home here at Darur Ridwan when I first arrived. Any prior feelings of uncertainty and apprehension were immediately banished as I was warmly welcomed into the community, and in particular, into Pak Kiai Aslam's family. Pak Kiai Aslam is a friendly, relaxed, family man who enjoys spending time with his young grandchildren and who willingly takes time out to answer my many questions. I appreciate his openness, generosity, enthusiasm, clear explanations and the freedom he has allowed me to wander around the pesantren and join in the everyday activities of the students. Also an authoritative teacher and strict adherer to religious rules, Pak Kiai Aslam demands a high level of respect and discipline from his students. As the founder and leader of Darur Ridwan, he plays a pivotal role in all aspects of life at the pesantren. A previously active member in local politics (including serving as a member of local parliament representing Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) for over 10 years) and the large Indonesian Muslim organisation, Nahdlutul Ulama (NU), Pak Kiai Aslam established this modern girls pesantren with his wife in 1989. An important aspect of pesantren Darur Ridwan is its modernity. The word modern here is used in reference to the school curriculum. In comparison to 'traditional' pesantrens where the curriculum is restricted to religious instruction, Darur Ridwan combines its religiously-oriented classes with general academic subjects such as chemistry, mathematics, psychology and English. Basic facilities However the term 'modern' is limited to a description of the curriculum. Facilities at Darur Ridwan are very basic, and although simplicity in everyday life is encouraged, Pak Kiai Aslam and the students are very aware of the impact this has on the quality of life and education at the pesantren. The living area allocated to the students consists of just three bedrooms which are shared between the 60 girls. One bedroom is shared by 40 of the junior students, and the other two have 10 senior students each. Each student sleeps on a thin mattress on the floor and has a small cupboard for their belongings. During the day the mattresses are stacked in the corner so the space can be used for other activities. There is not enough washing and bathroom facilities and no place for students who get sick. The classrooms are bare except for tables, chairs and a few home made posters; and the library consists of one bookshelf filled mainly with copies of old text books. This very simple existence however does not dampen the students' enthusiasm for their studies, or my enthusiasm for what I have found to be a community of young people who are dedicated to strengthening their understanding about their religion and working together to create a peaceful and pleasant environment around them. The restricted facilities and strict rules here means that there is not much variety in everyday life for the students who rarely leave the grounds of the pesantren. The students' daily activities at Darur Ridwan are dictated by the compulsory five daily prayers, beginning with the first prayer (subuh) at 4.30am. School starts at 7.00am (6 days a week) and classes take place in the class rooms until 12 noon. These classes are a mixture of religious instruction which includes a strong focus on Arabic (the language of the Al Qur'an) and general academic subjects. There are also other classes that take place twice a day in the mosque after prayer sessions. These classes are attended by all of the students and are led by Pak Kiai Aslam. At this time students learn to recite the Al Qur'an correctly and Pak Kiai Aslam offers his interpretations and explanations of stories and passages from different holy texts. Due to the intimacy of the environment at the pesantren classes are run in a very relaxed style, though discipline is never an issue. As in most parts of Indonesia things slow down in the afternoon after 12 noon prayer (dhuhur) as the 4.00am start begins to take its toll and people nod off for an afternoon rest. However after taking a break students are kept busy through the afternoon and evening with extra classes, study, and extra-curricular activities such as scouts, sport, sewing, cooking, the running of the canteen and general maintenance duties. 'Lights out' is at 10.00pm (11.00pm during exam time). I am very thankful for the hospitality and generosity I have received over the three months since I have been coming to and from Darur Ridwan. I have learnt more than I could have hoped for and have found a new family among my muslim friends here. As the newest member of the community I proudly wear my Darur Ridwan t-shirt and call this my pesantren. Mayra Walsh (m.walsh@ugrad.unimelb.edu.au) is a student of Indonesian Studies at Melbourne University and attended Darur Ridwan as part of her participation in the Acicis student exchange program. Inside Indonesia 74: Apr - Jul 2003