Digest 62

The end of the New Order - how would we know?

27 May, 1998

[Presented at ACFOA seminar, Canberra 27/5]

 

Since that historic Thursday 21 May, everything seems up for grabs. New Order politics have been so personalised that with Suharto gone a whole era seems to have passed.

  • Public attacks in recent days on the Suharto children's businesses for 'unfairly' winning government contracts, and a rush on BCA banks because the Suharto family owns most of the shares, are probably only the beginnings of the destruction of the entire Suharto business empire, with prosecutions perhaps to follow.
  • The sacking of LtGen Prabowo & his gang of state terrorists, and possibly a public denouncement by armed forces commander Wiranto of the tactics Prabowo was fond of, suggests Abri wants to distance itself from these tactics.

  • President Habibie, last remnant of Suharto's influence on Indonesian politics, is floundering. After initially pretending he might hang on until 2003, he said on Monday he would hold elections for a new government 'as soon as possible'. No one knows how much of the old electoral machinery will still be in place when they are held.
  • The release of two high profile political prisoners, with possibly more to come, signals a willingness of the current government to distance itself from the repressive posture of its predecessor.
  • The destruction of Suharto certainly does seem much more complete than anyone had dared to hope, myself included. I thought he would not go, or if he did go he would be able to maintain his influence from behind the scenes. Instead, he may well be looking for refuge overseas right now - a fate even worse than that of Sukarno, who at least was permitted to live out his life in secluded peace in Java.

    But has a new era really begun? Isn't it possible that everything but the face of the president stays the same? How would we know if the New Order really has passed? What are the milestones that need to be passed before we are satisfied a new era has dawned? In other words, how revolutionary is the situation in Indonesia?

    Journalists just love sharp discontinuities such as this. Historians (perhaps for that reason!) tend to distrust them as illusory. Discontinuities are certainly tricky things, especially when we're in the middle of one.

    Politically, we can probably identify three big milestones Indonesia needs to pass to be sure the New Order is no more. In order of increasing difficulty they are these:

  • Golkar collapses. The whole machinery of ideological and political manipulation needs to be dismantled. New political parties need the freedom to flourish. Indeed, a whole raft of laws restricting political activities, including the press, needs to be repealed or at least disabled. Some of these laws date back to colonial times, yet have been used continuously and as recently as a few weeks ago.

  • Army returns to barrack. Dwifungsi, the doctrine of the dual function of the armed forces, justifies the almost uncontested priority the army has had in politics since the beginning of the New Order. It has provided stability. It has also caused immense human suffering. Dwifungsi must be abolished, or at least sharply redefined, to be sure the New Order has passed.
  • The guilty punished. To make a clean break with the past, Indonesia needs a large symbolic act, in which the wrongs of the past are atoned, victims are reconciled, and the nation collectively says: 'Never again'. This could mean criminal tribunals for those guilty of human rights abuse on a massive scale, and rehabilitation of those millions victimised as second class citizens by their association with the order before Suharto's. If it is done, this will be not simply a legal act, but a cultural, even a religious one, like South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or the Holocaust Remembrances in Europe.
  • We could mention many more, but these three milestones at least establish the scale of transformation Indonesians are looking for. How is progress on these indicators to date?

  • Golkar collapses? Yes, very likely. The three political parties have been discredited by their silence during the crisis. Two of Golkar's own components (MKGR & Kosgoro) have announced they are forming new political parties. The two released political prisoners will both form new parties. Wheeling and dealing to form other new parties is furious. Party politics now seem completely fluid. David Bourchier (Sydney Morning Herald 25/5) suggests that three or four large new political parties may emerge: an Islamic middle class party (somewhat nationalist), a secular middle class party (somewhat market-oriented), possibly a rural Nahdatul Ulama party, and a workers' party. This would make the political landscape resemble Indonesia in the 1950s (Masyumi, PNI, NU, PKI respectively).

  • The army returns to barracks? Some will say: 'And pigs can fly'. It certainly is not happening yet, but it may come. Wiranto is certainly the good guy for getting rid of Prabowo, and he is now considerably stronger than even Habibie himself. This puts Wiranto in a similar position to that of Suharto himself on 1 October 1965, when he had disarmed Sukarno's palace guard and was poised to push aside Sukarno. When four students were shot dead on 12 May on their own campus by army sharp shooters, the student opposition failed to blame dwifungsi. This allowed Wiranto, as so many generals have done before him, to depict the shooting as an aberration rather than normal military practice.
  • However, despite a superficial resemblance to Suharto in 1965, Wiranto may not be able or even interested to play the same role. There is no Cold War to persuade the USA that military government is OK. There is no communism to persuade an Indonesian middle class it is OK. Indonesia faces economic reform so painful only a popular government can pull it off. Despite the surprisingly weak opposition pressure on dwifungsi, the army may well go half- way back into their barracks - perhaps along Pakistani or Thai lines. Even pulling back only half-way will have a major liberating effect on politics.

  • Punish the guilty? Releasing two political prisoners was an important step, as these people will invigorate the renewal movement. They will strengthen the ranks of those who demand 'total reformation' (as opposed to Habibie's more hesitant 'constitutional reformation'). But as symbolic acts go much, much more is required. Besides another two hundred or so political prisoners, including communists and East Timorese resistance leaders, there are vast numbers whose lives remain miserable because of their alleged communism 30 years ago - former political prisoners and their close relatives who have no civil rights at all. These people need to be completely exonerated, indeed they need to be honoured for their forbearance and loyalty to the nation.
  • This is an urgent agenda that is symbolic because it goes far beyond mere legality. It means dealing with the demons within Indonesian society. I can see it happening in my mind's eye, but not tomorrow.

    Yet even reconciliation with these millions of 'communists' will not be a large enough symbolic act to deal with the past. I am convinced that calls for a criminal court to try those responsible for encouraging those demons, from Suharto down, will grow. Some of these individuals are presently in government - for example the Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah, best known in Indonesia for having shot dead East Timorese resistance leader Nikolau Lobato. Wiranto has undertaken to 'protect' Suharto, and this presumably means no trial. Yet without it, the New Order has not passed.

    Indonesian politics in the New Order has been deeply elitist. That elite has been thrown into disarray by the economic crisis and the collapse of its central individual. If the movement for reform makes strong headway on all three fronts in the next few months - disband Golkar, return the army to barracks, and punish the guilty - then the New Order will have really passed and a new order begun. What are Indonesians going to call it? That new order can then begin the huge task of reconstructing the legal, economic, and political landscape of Indonesia. If, on the other hand, progress is slow on these criterion, then not enough has been resolved to justify speaking of a new era.

    Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside Indonesia' magazine.