It is still hard to believe. Suharto implanted his conservative, wily personality on Indonesian politics for over three decades. Now he is gone. Citizen Suharto. President Habibie. Indonesian politics are so personalised it is easy to assume that Suharto's resignation means the end of the now entirely anachronistic 'New Order'. But is it?
On Tuesday Suharto announced what was evidently 'Plan A'. He would continue as president, but would oversee a comprehensive reform process. It didn't wash with the Indonesian people. Nor, more importantly, with the elite around him. On Thursday 21 May he announced 'Plan B'. He stepped down to make way for his vice- president, but made no further mention of a reform process.
After announcing his resignation he said Habibie would continue as president until 2003. That suggests he did not have in mind a special session of the super-parliament (MPR) before then, at which another president could be chosen. Nor were elections mentioned. An outgoing president of course cannot set the agenda for his successor, but the suggestion seemed clear.
Behind the scenes, it appears armed forces commander General Wiranto played an important role. After intially encouraging the student protests, on Monday he warned that demonstrations should stop. He said the armed forces fully supported President Suharto. Early on Wednesday morning he ordered a massive display of military force in Jakarta to stop a planned popular protest. The turnaround suggests Wiranto was happy to use protesters to back up his own pressure on Suharto, but would not let them set his agenda.
The suppression of Wednesday's protest underlines once more that Indonesian politics are elitist - an affair for a tiny club. With army support, Plan B apparently intends to keep the succession issue within that tight little Jakarta club.
Yes, Suharto is out. But the military has guaranteed his 'safety'. That means he will not be prosecuted for human rights or economic crimes if the military can help it. Yes, the armed forces may have their differences with Habibie, who is not an army man. But these things can be resolved quietly.
Moreover, Thursday's historic transfer was perfectly constitutional.
Of course Plan B may be unravel as well. As it is, the pace of developments has far exceeded the planning of anybody within the elite. Only three weeks ago, amidst growing student protests, Suharto thought he could get away with offering reform 'but not till 2003'. Last Tuesday he offered to move things forward to a vague 'as soon as possible within the constitution'. On Thursday, years earlier than he had perhaps planned, he put in place his hand-picked successor.
Habibie is the constitutionally correct choice, but politically he may not have what it takes to keep politics confined within the club. Almost nobody believes Habibie will serve until 2003. He is an enthusiastic engineer rather than a professional politician.
Within Indonesia, these things matter less, and he may even be a popular president in some quarters. He heads ICMI, a government-sponsored Islamic association, whose many members will now hope he can offer greater influence for Islam. His high-tech industries, in the good days, made Indonesians feel proud.
But his close personal association with Suharto, and his own well-known nepotism, will make it difficult for him to embrace many in the opposition.
The army, now the power behind the throne, will try to handle the aftermath of Plan B by keeping politics inside the club. To them at least, Habibie does not represent the end of the New Order. He represents its extension into a second presidency.
The first test for Habibie will be whether he can form a credible cabinet. Just before the transfer of power, eleven of its most important members tendered their resignation. Almost certainly among the eleven was Coordinating Minister for Economy and Finance Ginanjar Kartasasmita. With more political savvy than Habibie, Ginanjar must represent a challenge to him. To avoid becoming a lame duck president from day one, Habibie will need to work hard to bring Ginanjar and the others under his leadership.
The opposition focused all its energies on forcing Suharto to resign. Once the initial euphoria of their success has passed, they may find they will have to work that much harder to gain a hearing.
A new opposition agenda will begin with the release of all the prisoners taken from opposition ranks and now languishing in jail. It will demand that ill-gotten loot be returned. More importantly, that past human rights abuses be prosecuted. It will demand new, freer and fairer laws in every area of national life - from politics, the courts, the media, and the environment, to the economy.
If the opposition can regroup and assert a new and more
fundamental agenda, then Plan B will also fail. Then the New
Order will have really ended.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
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