The images from Indonesia are frightening - smoke columns, rubber bullets, charred bodies. 'Electric' is how friends in Jakarta described the atmosphere to me. Few doubt Suharto can last beyond the end of 1998. But once he is gone, what comes next?
Will Indonesia, in three or five years time, be a Burmese- style pariah regime, withdrawn from the world under military dictatorship? Will it be locked into endemic unrest, producing a constant stream of refugees out of a myriad regional and ethnic conflicts, all tending towards the Yugoslav-style breakup of the nation?
Or will it perhaps, just perhaps, be experiencing renewal under a fresh government led by the civilian Amien Rais? It would be a change on every indicator for the Jakarta government - more popular, more Islamic, poorer, more chaotic, yet possibly more liberal and deeply stable than ever before.
What does seem certain to me is that the authoritarian but prosperous New Order we have grown to know is now gone for ever. It relied too much on a combination of high oil prices, the Asian Economic Miracle, the Cold War, and a docile, largely rural population - all things of the past.
What are the scenarios for Indonesia's long term future?
The disintegrative Yugoslav scenario, in which a leaderless Indonesia is consumed with all the pent-up conflict of the New Order, is a nightmare. We should not think of one great conflagration, probably, but many unrelated conflicts. Indonesia could enter a 'warlords' era similar to China between the world wars. Surrounding countries could be flooded with economic and political refugees.
However, though the military have often wielded this apocalyptic Yugoslav scenario, it seems an unlikely one. East Timor could well regain its independence amidst the turmoil. But much more than military power holds Indonesia together. The 1945 promise of peace and prosperity through unity is far from exhausted. Despite the events of recent days, I believe ethnic and religious chauvinism remain marginal phenomena in Indonesia.
More real is the almost equally depressing Burma scenario. Here Suharto succeeds in reasserting himself, but at the expense of greater reliance on the military, who are authorised to use whatever force is necessary to retain the status quo.
Economically, he takes advantage of the international backlash against the abuse of human rights this involves to withdraw from his IMF obligations. Indonesia turns into a pariah regime.
He also succeeds in appointing his own successor, one as authoritarian, as crony-capitalist, as he is today. Suharto will be the godfather ruling from the grave.
But again, this scenario is possible yet unlikely. It is difficult to imagine Indonesia's newly prosperous middle classes taking such isolationism lying down.
We have grown so used to Suharto's New Order that it comes as a shock to see it suddenly in its death throes. In a curious way, the New Order spread its influence even to Australia. Like the conservative new rich elite in Jakarta, we too have often measured Indonesian politics by one simple criterion: order is good, chaos is bad.
If we want to appreciate the atmosphere of anticipation in the city streets of Indonesia today we should learn to value the restorative potential of a little less order and to trust the good sense of most Indonesian citizens.
A substantial victory for opposition forces would be a hopeful scenario, not because it offers more order but because it offers a far healthier political process.
The ultimate opposition victory would be an Amien Rais-led people's power movement similar to the February 1986 revolution that brought about the downfall of Marcos. Amien Rais is a well- known Islamic leader and university intellectual.
This Manila scenario requires hundreds of thousands if not millions of people demonstrating peacefully in the streets of Jakarta, strong and united opposition leadership, and (importantly) some top army generals to join the crowd and thus avoid bloodshed. Possible, but a big ask.
Perhaps more likely is the lively politics that would follow a fracturing of the ruling elite into various interest groups. Each fraction would make its own appeals to the opposition. A coalition would emerge that enjoys popular support, at the price of constant bargaining.
Amien Rais and other popular figures such as Megawati would still play a significant role, but they would need to work together with people whose hands are on the levers of power today - including some army generals and economic technocrats.
It would be similar to the early New Order, where General Suharto negotiated with various anti-communist factions for support. This time, of course, Amien Rais and others who represent the people would have to work hard not to be sidelined later on.
Fortunately for them, there is no Cold War today to make the international community wink at military regimes. Indeed, no government of the future will be able to arrogate the same managerial, developmentalist centralisation of power to itself that the New Order enjoyed.
Because it would be somewhat chaotic, Islamic, and possibly unfriendly to international capital, analysts will be divided on whether a popular government is a good or a bad thing. Just as they remain divided on whether the 1950s under Sukarno were democratic or simply chaotic.
We could see a kind of crude separation of powers forced on
the nation not by liberal conviction but by the fractured nature
of power - much as happened in the 1950s. Rather than imperil
economic recovery by resorting to bloodshed, conflict could
slowly becomes institutionalised in law court and parliament. In
my view we would do well not to dismiss the civic virtues that
can develop under these new conditions.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
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