Two main groups fought for influence in this cabinet - those around Habibie and those around Suharto's daughter Tutut. Neither group excites the admiration of most democracy activists. There were also the technocrats, various groups within Golkar such as current provincial governors, and of course the army.
Despite strong predictions to the contrary, it now seems clear that not Habibie but Tutut has come out on top in this battle (see profiles of cabinet members in Digest 54). Habibie has some of his own there - Feisal Tanjung, Giri Suseno, Haryanto Dhanutirto, Rahardi Ramelan - but many others that were mooted failed to materialise.
Tutut has for some time been known among analysts in Jakarta as Indonesia's de facto prime minister. She has certainly demonstrated her strength in these appointments. Prominent 'Tutut men' include Hartono, Theo Sambuaga, Agung Laksono, and Ary Mardjono. Moreover the Suharto family's dynastic tendencies have been confirmed with her own appointment to cabinet - a first for a Suharto relative.
The result will be difficult to sell either for domestic political consumption or to the international financial community.
Domestically, a Habibie-influenced cabinet would have looked appealingly Islamic, nationalistic, and civilian. As it is, a Tutut-influenced one may well look nationalistic, but it will be a distinctive First Family nationalism with far less propaganda potential for the mass of Indonesians.
Those with strong Islamic credentials - especially Tutty Alawiyah - are too few to make much difference. There is very little here to entice Islamic opposition elements away from an embryonic alliance with their secular nationalist colleagues.
Economically, the cabinet will be inclined to maintain the anti-IMF line recently initiated by Suharto. A Habibie-influenced cabinet would have done the same. That is obvious from the appointments of, for instance, Fuad Bawazier, Bob Hasan, Saadilah Mursid, Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, Subiakto Cakrawerdaya, and even Ginanjar. Those who may take a more technocratic line hold less influence - Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, possibly Tanri Abeng, possibly Sjahril Sabirin. But some observers (eg Kwik Kian Gie) doubt the cabinet has enough expertise in it to carry through the looming battle with the IMF.
Finance Minister Fuad Bawazier seems keen on the currency board the IMF loves to hate. He is presently Director-General of Taxation. He is closer to the Suharto family than was Mar'ie Muhammad. Reputed to have been active with Peter Gontha in bringing Steve Hanke to Indonesia to promote Currency Board. He displaced Mar'ie Muhammad & Sudradjad Djiwandono in seniority on the National Economic & Financial Resilience Council formed in January. Is reputed to have a large house in Washington DC. Doubles up with positions in Jakarta Stock Exchange, Satelindo, and a bank. Member of board of YDSM, Suharto's private poverty relief program.
The appointment of Bob Hasan was announced as a concession to the Chinese community, who have never had a representative in a New Order cabinet until now and who had been scapegoated by some senior government figures during the recent food riots. But Hasan is far better known as a Suharto crony than as a credible representative of the Chinese community. This appointment, together with that of Tutut herself, will for many rather symbolise the friends-and-family nature of this cabinet.
Unlike cabinets in a parliamentary democracy, those under Indonesia's 1945 constitution are not accountable to the public but only to the president. The buck always stops at the president. In this cabinet the president looks more like a lone decision maker than he has ever done before. Just at a time when many hoped Suharto would slowly elevate himself beyond practical policy-making, this may well make him personally the target of policy failure to an extent not seen before.
It was supposed that Habibie would become more than a powerless VP - he will travel more than did Try Sutrisno. But his inability to bring his associates into cabinet now suggests he may not be that much different to Try. In any case, although he has at times approached opposition figures in displays of political ecumenism, Habibie is not an experienced politician. He has told associates repeatedly that Suharto promised him he would be president.
Abri, either retired or active, is not as strongly represented as before. Nor do they have the vice-presidency at this moment approaching the succession. This may well lead to dissatisfaction within Abri. Wiranto, often regarded as less beholden to Suharto's influence and more interested in Abri autonomy than Feisal Tanjung, holds unusual power with the combined armed forces commandership and defence portfolio. But this may be merely temporary and he may soon only be Defence Minister.
In short, this cabinet will by no means satisfy popular
demands for political reform. The list is made up largely of
political conservatives and loyalists. It contains a few capable
people - Giri Suseno for instance, or Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. But
very few have reputations as independent spirits responsive to
the public. This cabinet may well hasten rather than prolong the
end of the Suharto presidency.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
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