Indonesia's super parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), meets briefly next March to appoint the country's president for another five year term. Despite much talk of opposition to Suharto's continued rule, it now looks as if the event will prove entirely predictable and Suharto will have a smooth ride. The reason? The president may have made his peace with the armed forces.
Even so, as the crucial MPR session approaches when Suharto will be appointed president for probably the last time, nothing is left to chance. On 9 August, President Suharto asked a meeting of all 500 members of the new regular parliament (to form half the MPR) to 'consider' reinvigorating his emergency powers. MPR decisions to grant the president emergency powers have been a regular feature of its five-yearly meetings. The model for the special powers is the letter the ailing President Sukarno gave to General Suharto on 11 March 1966.
The 1993 MPR session did not mention them, leading some to think the New Order's habit of resorting to extrajudicial, emergency rule was maturing into more rule-based conduct. But the 9 August request, in which Suharto spoke for two hours without a drink of water about his role in saving the nation at crucial times from 1945 onwards, is a reminder that little has changed. Commentators assumed the president wants the powers this time to ensure no one takes the initiative of chosing a successor out of his own hands.
A popular activity for observers is to look for rebels within the ranks. Suharto's emergency powers are presumably aimed at them more than at protest movements within society as a whole. The MPR consists of 1000 members. Its 500 non-parliamentary members are appointed by the government, and are now mostly known. The preponderance of bureaucrats and their spouses and children is overwhelming. Any rebels will have to be among these 1000.
The most important body within the MPR is the Working Committee. Several of the men mooted as possible vice-presidential and hence presidential candidates are on this committee: Information Minister Gen Hartono, Assistant for Abri Social and Political Affairs Maj- Gen Bambang Yudhoyono, Army Chief of Staff Gen Wiranto, and Housing Minister Akbar Tandjung. By putting these rivals together in one place, observers note, they will each stop the other from making a premature move. That takes care of them.
Furthermore, Wiranto is expected to keep armed forces (Abri) factions in line, while Hartono will do the same for Golkar. There are certainly plenty of factions within Golkar. Insiders acknowledge the existence of groups loyal to chairman Harmoko, to Hartono, to Research and Technology Minister Habibie and to Suharto's daughter Tutut. Some of this is cast as conflict between the military and 'civilian' streams within Golkar. Several public spats in recent months have brought this factionalism into the open. Competition between Golkar chairman Harmoko and former Abri Chief of Social and Political Affairs LtGen Syarwan Hamid to chair the MRP session also remains intense.
However, most observers dismiss the Golkar factionalism as normal, driven by personal ambition, and unlikely to rock the national boat. Beyond its main task of winning elections, Golkar in any case lacks independent clout.
What about rebels within the armed forces? Given Suharto's vigorous control over senior officer appointments in recent years, factions within Abri are more difficult to discern. Observers have long distinguished a small number of 'Green', Islamic, pro-Suharto officers from the more numerous but more junior 'Red-and-White', secular anti-Suharto officers. But this distinction now appears less useful, for reasons made clear below.
Rebels are proving hard to find! The impression is confirmed when we ask why the presumed factional leaders are making so little use of the abundant propaganda ammunition available to them.
The crisis sparked by the collapse of Southeast Asia's currencies could hardly have come at a worse time for Suharto. It has put severe pressure on government reserves and led to inevitable belt-tightening. One would expect the exercise of 'rescheduling' non-urgent projects to be a wonderful opportunity for opponents to create a scene about the economic damage created by Suharto's nepotism.
The ammunition is there - son Tommy Suharto's Timor 'national car' has been exempted from rescheduling, as has (so far) daughter Titiek's Malaysia-Indonesia bridge. Neither obviously benefit the common people. Furthermore, in the face of the nation's financial difficulties, one of six large companies given tax holidays recently is owned by the Suharto family (Kiani pulp). Yet criticism of all these measures has been less than determined.
Some Indonesian academics have speculated that the reason could be somewhat as follows. In the early 1990s, Suharto tried to counterveil dissident (Red-and-White) Abri opinion by making an appeal to Islam, led by his favourite Minister Habibie. This provided a spark of debate not seen for years in Indonesia. However, Suharto has now abandoned that strategy, and the initiatives Habibie took in this regard have been allowed to wither. Instead, Suharto has made a deal with senior Red-and-White Abri figures. Possibly he has given them a guarantee that Abri will determine the next presidency, in exchange for Abri protection of the Suharto family.
The implications of such a deal are major. Unlike the early 1990s, when it vigorously leaked anti-Suharto material to the press, Abri has today lost interest in coming down on Suharto and now regards him as an ally, not to be criticised.
The loser in this scenario is Habibie. Pro-government academic Prof Juwono Sudarsono appeared to confirm this when he said recently that the next president would be once more from Abri. The statement triggered a media debate about the relative merits of Abri versus 'civilian' (read: Habibie) leadership. Some thought Juwono was asked to float this trial balloon precisely to evince a polemic and identify Habibie supporters. Other than Habibie himself, however, few protested strongly.
If this speculation is correct, then Suharto has achieved what Sukarno could not: continuity even after his departure from the palace, minus serious upheaval within the elite, and minus concessions to demands for democracy.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
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