DIGEST No. 36
Title: Democratic history offers hope for the future
Date: 30 May 1997
(This appeared in the Weekend Australian 31 May - 1 June
1997)
Reporting on the elections confirmed prejudices about Indonesia
in the minds of many sceptical readers. The violence and the
predictable outcome simply proved that Indonesian culture is
tragically authoritarian.
But I cannot make myself believe such a thing. Indonesia has a
history of democracy. Eighty years ago, colonial governors-
general Idenburg and Van Limburg Stirum responded to middle class
pressure by relaxing bans on the press and on political parties.
Throughout the first decade of independence after World War II,
a democracy based on a free press, a strong parliament and an
independent judiciary should have for ever banished the prejudice
that these things are impossible in Indonesia. Sjahrir,
Indonesia's first prime minister, made the concept of the
coalition cabinet, responsible to parliament, almost routine.
True, in each case the democratic reforms were eventually
overturned by an elite who said they feared 'chaos' from the
masses. But the experience proved that nothing is impossible.
None of the factors working against democracy today are absolute.
Economic elitism, the dominance of the executive (with the
military at its heart), a personalised politics that says 'l'etat
c'est moi', and a history of authoritarian ideologies - these are
all realities, but none are written in stone.
Conversely, many factors working for it are already in place,
waiting to play a larger role. The press is lively, the middle
class is tired of corruption, and workers understand their
rights. There are committed parliamentarians, political parties
anxious to shed their image of ventriloquist puppet, judges who
want to do a good job, and a responsible non-government
organisation movement. The economy is doing well, and political
discourse is now much less polarised along primordial lines.
What would it take to tip the balance again?
The first step may occur almost naturally. Differentiation in the
power structure means that instead of all power being
concentrated in one place, several power centres develop to do
different jobs. A differentiation process, already underway,
could really speed up once the succession issue is resolved.
Why? Because the next president will probably not have the
political resources to concentrate power as Suharto has done. We
will no longer speak of 'the elite', but of several elites, each
with some claim to power, whether physical, economic or moral.
Even if the next president is not by temperament a Sjahrir, he
or she may need to delegate powers to someone like Sjahrir, who
can balance the demands of one interest group against another.
Complexity will become an accepted part of the political
landscape. It would be wonderful if, as Fidel Ramos appears to
do, the next president can enjoy this complexity. In any case,
like the leaders of South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, he or she
will have to live with it.
But won't this transition to complexity also bring instability?
Conservative commentators will surely answer yes. They may even
use words like 'loss of control' or 'fracturing of the body
politic'. Certainly the demands on the political system will be
stated loudly.
But the new situation should really be described more positively.
What about 'the politics of negotiation'? For negotiation is the
basis of democracy, indeed, the basis for resolving conflicts
that would otherwise threaten the nation.
Sooner rather than later, those in power now will face a moment
of decision. They will either embrace the new complexity, and
embrace negotiation, or else be spooked by their fear of 'chaos'
into once more seeking safety in the arms of repressive
centralised power.
Unfortunately for those who idealise order, this second choice
can no longer eliminate chaos permanently. On the contrary, it
will worsen the present alienation of the state from public life.
The anarchic riots in Java and Kalimantan should really be read
as warnings _against_ a security approach. Further loss of faith
could mean catastrophe. In other words, this choice could be the
elite's last.
The first choice, to embrace negotiation, will restore the
people's hopes in what the state can do for the public good.
True, it will complicate day-to-day government. But it will also
rebuild reserves of patience and provide a better guarantee of
lasting stability.
Of course it will take more than celebrating negotiation to tip
the balance. The new leadership will be forced by social pressure
to revitalise existing institutions of negotiation that have lost
their potency - parliament, the courts, political parties. They
may need repeal some notorious laws. But constitutional change
will not be immediately necessary. In other words, it may turn
out to be easier than some people think to prove the sceptics
wrong and embrace a better future.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
