DIGEST No. 34
Title: Is Islam now the alternative?
Date: 11 June, 1997
The complete collapse of the PDI in the 1997 election left the
Islamically coloured PPP as the only viable non-government party.
Does this mean the Indonesian government now faces a Turkish, or
even an Algerian scenario of popular opposition focussed only on
the symbols of Islam? No, it does not.
Not that the PPP as sole vehicle for Islamic opposition is a
completely implausible idea. Vigorous PPP rallies were the life
of the election campaign. The Mega-Bintang phenomenon (supported
by the Solo branch of PPP) brought disenfranchised PDI voters
under the PPP banner - though probably more did not use their
vote at all. A PPP branch in Madura under the charismatic
leadership of Kiai Alawy Muhammad successfully forced the
government to repeat the election locally six days later. Ballot
boxes had been destroyed in rioting by PPP voters turned away by
officials at the 29 May poll.
Many district branches beyond Madura refused to sign the election
result, a largely ceremonial requirement. Two provincial
executives appear determined to do likewise - West Sumatra and
Southeast Sulawesi.
At a national meeting held in Jakarta last week top PPP
executives were under intense pressure from below to refuse to
acknowledge the election result. One national executive member
thought to be responsive to this moral indignation from below is
PPP secretary-general Tosari Widjaya.
According to the anonymous Internet service SiaR, the government
was so worried about this post-election militancy it offered six
top PPP office holders Rp 1 trillion (almost AU$500 million!)
last weekend for 'party development' purposes, in exchange for
unreserved acceptance of the election result. As the story
spread, branches rang in threatening mass action if the office
bearers accepted.
Former Religious Affairs Minister Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara,
himself known as a militant Muslim, publicly told the PPP it
would be opposing both the government and the Islamic community
if it refused to accept the result. In the end, the PPP announced
a non-committal 'cooling down' period.
However, despite what the branches may demand, the PPP is not
about to become an opposition party. Key observers are convinced
that (presumably with or without the trillion rupiah) the PPP
will submit meekly after its 'cooling down' period. Both NU
chairman Aburrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Muhammadiyah chairman
Amien Rais say the PPP would not dare do otherwise because it
would imperil the (much increased) number of PPP parliamentary
delegates now poised to take office.
The fact is that, like PDI's Soerjadi, PPP chairman 'Buya' Ismail
Hasan Metareum is government-approved. The party is entirely
dependent on government funding. Buya knows that his political
life would end abruptly at a PDI-style 'special congress' if he
did not comply. It would be easy enough for opponents to connect
rebellious sentiment with 'anarchic' pre-election violence.
Nor does PPP represent all the Islamic interests in Indonesia.
Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation,
is almost unrepresented in its leadership. Its chairman Gus Dur
worked actively to 'deflate' (gembos) PPP votes during the
campaign.
There is a desire for change. But the PPP is not positioned to
be its champion. PPP is almost as much part of the political
establishment as is Golkar. The same is even more true of ICMI,
once regarded as another Islamic foot in the door of the hitherto
secular New Order regime. Neither PPP nor ICMI are about to make
Islam an alternative.
The real political divide in Indonesia is not religious, between
secularism and Islam. It is economic, between the elite
establishment and the poor masses. Ever optimistic, those masses
were momentarily excited by the militancy of PPP branch leaders
in places like Solo and Madura. But that was not enough to make
PPP a reliable constitutional outlet for their demands.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, 'Inside
Indonesia' magazine.
