Just how much politics is there in Indonesia? Many observers feel there is less than meets the eye. The state is so strong it can afford to ignore legitimacy issues. They point to the ease with which oppositionists are invariably removed and elections manipulated. However, others stress the importance of intra-elite conflict as a source of politics. Factions of the bureaucracy compete for public acknowledgement. Also, these observers point out, in times of stress the state frequently mobilises social groupings outside the state, such as religious groups, to support crackdowns on oppositionists. At such times it is compelled to produce moral arguments. My own feeling is that legitimation processes are certainly important in Indonesia, even if they do not work as they do in democracies. Events since 27 July provide excellent case study material. Already before the PDI headquarters invasion, the government (or rather the President and key Abri officers like Chief of Political and Social Affairs Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid) was creating a crisis atmosphere by cultivating images of the chaos of 1965/66. At the beginning of the New Order, leaders of the new government successfully mobilised masses of religious groups on the theme of atheistic communism to consolidate their power. Hundreds of thousands died in the ensuing massacres. They also mobilised student groups to protest against the corruption of the Old Order elite. Syarwan Hamid described the July 27 riots as no longer due to conflict between Suryadi and Megawati but 'between the forces of the New Order against a reviving Old Order', which had to be dealt with using New Order strength. Intimidating words. President Suharto has repeatedly equated talk of democracy, human rights and the environment with 'mental rebellion' [makar, a military term for insurrection]. Indeed, a considerable number of pro-government groups have gathered at rallies in support of a crackdown. Sixty one pro- Golkar groups made a statement condemning Megawati supporters' free speech forum at a meeting with Syarwan Hamid toward the end of July; a large Kisdi Islamic rally at a Jakarta mosque early August demanded a stepped up fight against communism; a rally of 30 000 in Senayan parking grounds on 11/8 supported the government; and now thousands of youth affiliated with AMPI are walking from one town to another holding rallies all over Indonesia, finally to converge on Jakarta on 11 September. Though many deride them as artificial, there is no doubt these rallies do reflect community support for 'national stability' arguments. But social tensions are not as high now as they were three decades ago. This, fortunately, will mean that mobilisational tactics aimed at stimulating communalism are likely to fall short of their target, or even to turn against their instigators. A meeting of kiais in East Java, for example, organised by the provincial governor and the military commander immediately after the riots, refused to endorse a motion to condemn the PRD as communist. East Java is traditionally one of Indonesia's most volatile areas. Nurcholish Madjid and (even more so) Abdurrahman Wahid have tirelessly called on Muslims not to be drawn into creating communal conflicts. ICMI has produced a statement that does not wholly endorse the 'condemn the PRD' line, calling for the rule of law to be applied. Even Amien Rais, an influential conservative columnist, appears to be hesitating about the wisdom of stimulating communal tension on the scale Syarwan Hamid appears to want. Today Army chief of staff Gen Hartono, when he says it is 'dangerous' to forget the events of 1965/66, because 'communism knows no time limits and always keeps an eye out to see if we are losing our vigilance, and then they will slip into our minds', recalls a hypochondriac to some. The anonymous Internet news service Istiqlal conducted a random poll of 3400 pedestrians in central Jakarta last week and found that 79% 'did not believe at all' that there was a communist threat dimension to the conflict between Megawati and Suryadi. Only 6% believed that PRD was a communist organisation. Indeed, senior military intelligence officers have made a number of gaffes following the Jakarta riots. They circulated a chart showing the Australian Labor Party (the governing party in Australia under close Suharto friend Paul Keating) as a source of funds for PRD. It also mentioned Amnesty International, the National People's Army of the Philippines, the Asian Students Association, and a couple of supposed communists in Europe as part of a grand conspiracy. The diagram was reproduced without comment in the weekly Sinar and the daily Merdeka, the former describing Megawati's PDI as a 'Trojan Horse' for communism. Syarwan Hamid later retracted the ALP connection. The military had also said the parents of PRD leader Budiman Sujatmiko were communists, but were proven wrong when the latter came forward publicly and said they came from an Islamic Hisbullah family in 1945. Since the armed forces have always been so highly politicised, there is also the problem of dissident opinion within Abri. The most strident criticism of Abri's repressive role traditionally comes from retired officers. Following the Jakarta riots, retired Gen Nasution, whilst reminding people to take the spectre of communism seriously, sharply criticised the 'shoot on the spot' order issued to troops on the streets as damaging to Abri's image. Retired Gen Soemitro, who had lost his job over similar riots in 1974, indirectly accused Suharto of putting his own interests above those of the nation, and feared that the 'disinformation' about communism was intended to sharpen social tensions and carry Indonesia back to the bad old days. Meanwhile Rudini, also a retired officer but better known as former Interior Minister, feared that the credibility of Abri had been severely compromised by its repressive role. Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Soesilo Soedarman called on retired officers (who are supposed to join the veteran league Pepabri) not to break ranks like this. He referred particularly to a Statement of Concern, calling for a rejection of violence in politics and a return to morality, launched on 1 July by a prominent group led by former Abri Social and Political Affairs Chief Bambang Triantoro, now an outspoken critic. In July, Abri Commander Feisal Tanjung warned troops not to be influenced by 'leftism' reminiscent of '1965'. Abri leaders are well aware what is at stake - not merely the preservation of Suharto's presidency, but the very concept of military dominance upon which the New Order is constructed. The observations above do not suggest the armed forces are seriously split, or that a Ramos is about to emerge to lead hundreds of thousands on to the streets as in Manila 1986. Abri has long prepared multi-layered contingency plans for an occasion just like this. These may be adequate to do the job of maintaining the political status quo. But if it is really dependent on the success of methods of mobilisation it has found effective in the past, it may find that this time they do not work.
Gerry van Klinken, editor, Inside Indonesia magazine.
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